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## MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT'S FILES

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with  
Ambassador Huang Chen, Chief of PRC  
Liaison Office in WashingtonDATE AND TIME: Wednesday, May 30, 1973  
9:15 a.m. - 9:30 a.m.

PLACE: The Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Ambassador Huang Chen  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

The President greeted Ambassador Huang Chen. The Ambassador said he wanted to thank the President for the friendly reception. He brought with him best wishes from Mr. and Mrs. Mao, and Mr. and Mrs. Chou En-lai. The President thanked him, and said he wanted the Ambassador to convey his personal messages to Chairman Mao and to Premier Chou En-lai.

Dr. Kissinger had had sensitive talks with the Chairman and the Premier, the President noted, especially as the Brezhnev talks might affect third parties. Dr. Kissinger had told Huang Chen we were prepared to reach an understanding about consultations. His statements reflected U.S. policy. If the Premier and Chairman Mao approved, we were prepared to make a more formal understanding on these points.

Our commitment to better relations with the PRC was made, the President stressed. People who knew the President well knew that his commitment, when made, was solid. Good relations with the People's Republic of

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China were in the self-interest of the United States. Our self-interest required an independent and strong China. It was a cornerstone of U.S. policy to see that action was taken for the strength of China. A meeting was coming up with Brezhnev; the important thing was that there would be eight days of conversations. But nothing would be agreed to that in any way would be detrimental to the People's Republic of China. The President had talked to Dr. Kissinger and instructed him to keep the Ambassador fully informed.

The other point the President wished to make to the Ambassador concerned the Southeast Asian situation. The Vietnam peace agreement removed a major irritant in our relations. But there was one outstanding problem, that is Cambodia. He could not emphasize too much the importance of reaching a settlement in Cambodia similar to that in Laos. Now China played a very important role. It would be a tragedy if we allowed Cambodia to flare up and reopen the conflict all over Indochina. The President wanted to emphasize that the United States was not committed to any one man. But there could not be peace at the point of a gun -- on either side. We wanted a settlement that let the warring elements live together. Over a period of time the Cambodian people could determine which is better for their future. The highest priority, the President reiterated, was to work out some sort of peace agreement in Cambodia.

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